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The Retributive Theory of "Just Deserts"
and Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining
DAviD A. STARKWEATHER*
INTRODUCTION
One evening, Karen found herself alone in the restroom of a public health
building.' Occupied with thoughts of the day's business, she could never
have imagined the horrible event that was about to take place. Karen was
raped at knifepoint in the restroom.
Police arrested a suspect, and Karen positively identified him as the man
who had raped her. He was only seventeen. Because he was a juvenile, he
was eligible for a reduced sentence. The suspect had been in and out of
trouble almost all of his seventeen years and presently had several burglary
charges pending. As part of a plea bargain, the youth pleaded guilty to one
count of burglary, and the rape charge was dropped. Karen was never
consulted about the plea or even notified that the prosecutor was considering
a plea agreement.
Karen was horrified to discover that her case had been dismissed. In her
mind, the criminal justice system had failed. She was raped. She was the
one who was going to have to live with the memory of that night. The
offender never received what he deserved.
She then urged her friends and community to write the prosecutor
demanding that charges be refiled. Bowing to the public pressure, the
prosecutor reinstated the charges and brought the suspect back into court.
The system, however, repeated itself. Again, the prosecutor reached a
plea agreement without Karen having been notified or consulted. The suspect
pleaded guilty as a youthful offender and received a lenient sentence under
the youthful offender statute. Karen was again horrified. She believed that
the suspect should have received an adult sentence and that the criminal
system had neglected her interests.
Cases like this have led jurisdictions to recognize the plight of a crime
victim. Many now have programs aimed at aiding a crime victim after his
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1989,
Wheaton College, Illinois.
1. This story is based on a report told to Daniel Van Ness and reprinted in his book. D.
VAN NEss, CRBm AND Is Vicrws 23-24 (1986).
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or her victimization. 2 It has been suggested, however, that "victims' rights"
programs have been motivated by victims' desire for revenge or retaliation
rather than by the moral aspect of retribution.' Victim participation in the
plea bargain process can be justified, however, not by a victim's desire for
retaliation but by a theory of punishment that recognizes a formal role for
a victim in the criminal process system. This theory is called the "just
deserts" theory of retribution. 4 This Note proposes that, under a just deserts
theory, a victim has interests in the criminal process other than revenge or
retaliation and that victim participation in plea bargaining best protects
these interests without unduly burdening other parties involved in the plea
bargaining process.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze a victim's right to participate in
the criminal process, specifically plea bargaining, under a moral or a just
deserts theory of retribution. To date, no one has analyzed whether a victim
should be given a participatory role in the plea bargain process under this
definition of retribution. Part I of this Note will examine the concept of
just deserts retribution and a victim's relevance to this theory. Part II will
briefly review the present process of plea bargaining. Part III will examine
what interests, under the just deserts theory, a victim has in plea bargaining.
In Part IV, this Note will discuss the relevance of victim participation with
regard to the traditional plea bargain parties. Finally, this Note will suggest
some ways that the plea bargain process can better accommodate a victim
in a retributive criminal justice system.
I. RETRIBUTION
Over the last two decades the retribution theory of punishment has been
rediscovered. Due mainly to the inability of other theories, such as reha-
bilitation and deterrence, to effectuate a reduction in crime, philosophers
and scholars have reexamined retribution as a viable justification for pun-
ishment.'
Even though retribution is considered to be the oldest theory of punish-
ment, 6 there has not been universal agreement as to its definition. Tradi-
2. See, e.g., Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (1988)); Bill of Rights for Victims and
Witnesses of Violent Crime Act, Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1401-1408 (Smith-Hurd 1991);
Victim's and Witness's Bill of Rights, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1510 to -1560 (Law. Co-op.
1990).
3. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STA. L. REv. 937, 994 (1985).
4. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40
HAsTINos L.J. 229, 247 (1989).
5. C.S. LEwts, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN TEa DO K 287
(1970); J. MtRsPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUsTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
(1979); see A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
6. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRnnNtA LAW 24 (1972).
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tionally, however, the underlying notion of retribution is that "criminal
behavior constitute[s] a violation of the moral or natural order ... and,
having offended that order, require[s] payment of some kind. ' 7 Therefore,
a criminal is punished because he or she "deserves" it. This justification
for punishment is appropriately called the principle of "just deserts.",,
The concept of just deserts seeks to preserve human dignity through
punishment. It asserts that a person is a rational individual with the free
will to make a moral choice whether or not to engage in conduct known
to be prohibited. Retribution under a just deserts principle treats a defendant
as a dignified human being by responding to his or her conduct in a way
that respects his or her choice to engage in wrongful behavior.9 This concept
differs radically from the utilitarian theories of rehabilitation and deter-
rence.' 0
What is the "moral order" that the retributionists seek to restore? Moral
order is the existence of "right" relationships among individuals and between
7. Jensen, A Christian Defense of Retribution, 7 CnxmRsi LEGAL Soc'y Q. 11, 11 (1986).
8. See id.
9. A. voN HIRsCH, supra note 5, at 125.
10. Under the utilitarian theories of rehabilitation and deterrence, an individual loses his
or her human dignity once he or she has been arrested. The reason is that both rehabilitation
and deterrence remove desert from the concept of punishment. C.S. LwIs, supra note 5, at
288. But the concept of desert is the only means of connecting punishment and justice. Id.
Rehabilitation and deterrence theories are concerned only with whether the punishment cures
and whether it deters, respectively. Neither is concerned with "what is just." "We demand of
a deterrent not whether it is just but whether it will deter. We demand of a cure not whether
it is just but whether it succeeds." Id.
Under a rehabilitation theory, the purpose of punishment is to "cure" an offender. Because
crime is seen as a disease instead of a moral choice, a cure is needed to rid an offender of
the disease. Id. One must remember, however, that the "cure" is compulsory. Id. An offender
has no choice whether he or she wants to be cured. The compulsory cure, in fact, has no
limits. An individual is to be "treated" until he is "cured." Id. at 290.
Under a deterrence model, an offender is punished to make him or her an example to
others. An offender is not treated as a dignified human being, but rather as a means to an
end. By excluding the concept of desert, an offender is treated merely as an object. "Why,
in Heaven's name, am I to be sacrificed to the good of society in this way?-unless I deserve
it." Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
Where the justification of punishment is its deterrent effect, it is not even necessary that an
individual punished be guilty. Deterrence will be effective as long as the public understands
that if they act like the individual being punished, they will be punished similarly. Id. "The
punishment of an innocent, that is, an undeserving, man is wicked only if we grant the
traditional view that righteous punishment means deserved punishment." Id.
Retributionists do not claim that the goals of rehabilitation and deterrence are excluded
from or even contrary to a retributive theory but that they are merely secondary. Jensen,
supra note 7, at 12. As C.S. Lewis stated: "I am ready to make both the protection of society
and the 'cure' of the criminal as important as you please in punishment, but only on a certain
condition; namely that the initial act of thus interfering with a man's liberty be justified on
grounds of desert." C.S. LEWIs, On Punishment: A Reply to Criticism, in GOD IN THE DOCK
295, 298 (1970) [hereinafter C.S. LEWIs, On Punishment].
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an individual and the community." The "right" relationships are governed
by a higher authority' 2 whether it be God, 3 natural law, 14 or social contract.'5
In other words, the "moral order" is the ideal state in which the community
should function. Therefore, under this definition of retribution, crime is
11. D. VAN NESS, supra note 1, at 117-21. A good example of this type of retributive
justice system is the ancient Hebrew system of pure retributive justice that could be described
as shalom. Shalom meant more than absence of conflict; the term described completeness,
fulfillment, wholeness-the existence of right relationships among individuals, the community,
and God. Id. at 120. Crime was thought to break the shalom. Therefore, the ancient Hebrew
justice system aimed to restore "right" relationships. Id.
Based on retribution, the Hebrew justice system gave the world the concept of lex talionis
(eye for eye, tooth for tooth). See Exodus 21:24; Leviticus 24:20; Deuteronomy 19:21. However,
the Hebrew system was not based on revenge or retaliation. If that were the case, most
criminal sanctions would have called for mutilation of some sort-literally, an eye for an eye.
This was not the case. Under the Hebrew system, restitution was the primary form of criminal
sanction. Id. at 117-21. In fact, in the entire Hebrew law (not including the capital offenses
of murder, rape, adultery, and kidnapping) only one crime called for mutilation. J. WA.vooRD
& R. ZUCK, THE BIELE KNOWLEDGE COMMENTARY: AN ExPOSITION OF THE SCRIPTURES BY
DALLAS SEMINARY FACULTY: OLD TESTAMENT 307 (1985). That law read: "If two men are
fighting and the wife of one of them comes to rescue her husband from his assailant, and she
reaches out and seizes him by his private parts, you shall cut off her hand. Show her no
pity." Deuteronomy 25:11-12 (New International).
12. Some commentators have rejected retribution because of its reliance on a "higher
authority":
"[W]hat justification could there be for rules requiring that those who break
them should be made to suffer?" except perhaps in theological terms. For appeals
to authority apart, we can justify rules and institutions only by showing that
they yield advantages. Consequently, retributivist answers to the problem can be
shown, on analysis, to be ... utilitarian reasons in disguise.
S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, SociAL PRINCimLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE (1959), quoted in
T. HoNDmRiCH, PUNISHMENT: THE Su'POSED JusTIIcATIoNs 28 (1969) (emphasis added). These
commentators reject retributivism in favor of a utilitarian theory of punishment because it is
not governed by a "higher authority." However, they fail to recognize that even the utilitarian
theory must be based on some type of appeal to higher authority.
Utility is considered to be what will make the community, as a whole, happier. C.S. LEwis,
On Punishment, supra note 10, at 296. Are utilitarians ready to pursue their goal, community
happiness, at all costs, or is there some point where the utilitarian will not act, no matter
how much it will increase community happiness? Utilitarian theory is based on the concept of
relativism. Jensen, supra note 7, at 13. Relativism posits that no imaginable act is good or
bad in itself. Id. Presumably, however, even a utilitarian would not advocate rape. A utilitarian
might argue that rape will never add to community happiness, thus it is always bad. Yet,
relativism holds that rape may at some point become useful. If rape is thought to be "bad"
under all circumstances, relativism is abandoned and some "eternal" standard measures the
act of rape.
Once it is admitted that there is at least one act that is always "bad" or that there is at
least one thing community members ought not do, the utilitarian position is lost. C.S. LEwis,
On Punishment, supra note 10, at 296. One is then judging "utility" by some other standard,
not by community happiness but rather by higher authority, "whether we call it Conscience,
or Practical Reason, or Law of Nature," or whatever. Id. Therefore, even utilitarians must
appeal to a higher authority.
13. D. VAN NESS, supra note 1.
14. C.S. LEwis, On Punishment, supra note 10, at 296.
15. Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues
and Problems, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 117, 142 (1984).
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conduct that disturbs the "right" relationships within the community:
relationships between offender and victim, offender and community, and
victim and community.' 6
Since crime is defined as the violation or disturbance of the "right"
relationships in the community, the goal of the retributive theory of justice
is to reconcile these relationships. Reconciliation is accomplished by making
an offender "pay" for the disturbance his or her conduct has caused.
A criminal "deserves" to be punished because he or she has violated the
"moral order," but what punishment does he or she "deserve?" A core
tenet within the just desert theory of retribution is proportionality.1 7
If one asks how severely a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, a familiar
principle comes to mind: Severity of punishment should be commensurate
with the seriousness of the wrong. Only grave wrongs merit severe
penalties; minor misdeeds deserve lenient punishments. Disproportionate
penalties are undeserved-severe sanctions for minor wrongs or vice
versa."'
Because the goal of retributive justice is to restore the relationships that
have been broken, a defendant must be punished only to the extent necessary
to restore the relationships. In other words, the level of punishment must
be proportional to the seriousness of the crime.
The seriousness of a defendant's conduct is expressed as a function of
the harm caused by the conduct and the degree of a defendant's responsi-
bility for the crime.' 9 Harm is composed of many components, such as
physical and psychological harm to victims and economic and emotional
costs to society.20 The incorporation of harm into the calculus of just
punishment should seem intuitive; thus, proportionality would require a
murderer to receive a more severe punishment than a petty thief.21
In a retributive framework, incorporating harm into the punishment
calculus also makes sense philosophically. Recognition of harm emphasizes
that crime does not merely violate a rule or code; it also affects both victims
and society. Including harm in the calculus preserves human dignity because
doing so not only recognizes the consequence of an offender's free will,
but also considers the offense as an injury to another person.2 "The 'just
16. D. VAN NEss, supra note 1.
17. A. voN Hmsca, supra note 5, at 66; Henderson, supra note 3, at 991; Hoffmann,
supra note 4, at 248.
18. A. voN HmscH, supra note 5, at 66 (emphasis in original).
19. R. NOZICK, PsmosopmcAL ExPI.A~AONs 363-66 (1981). For a discussion of the
problems associated with using harm as a component in the punishment calculus, see G.
FrETcHER, A ClrmE oF SELF-DEFENSE 63-83 (1988); Henderson, supra note 3, at 999-1001.
20. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 953-64. These components of harm are explicitly
recognized in the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248 (1982).
21. Henderson, supra note 3, at 1000.
22. See D. VAN NEss, supra note 1, at 138.
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deserts' model of justice specifically views the concern for victims in the
criminal justice process as an integral part of [proportionality]." 23
Once the level of seriousness of harm has been ascertained, it must be
placed on a punishment scale to determine a proportional punishment.
However, determining a proportional punishment is not as exact a science
as the calculus of just punishment would lead one to believe. "This is
because the basic retributive concept of 'desert' and the notion of individual
responsibility on which it depends involve not merely objective facts and
circumstances that can be observed and proven, but also a set of beliefs
about the extent of 'free will' in a fundamentally deterministic world." 24
II. THE PLEA BARGAIING PROCESS
Traditionally, crime victims have not had a formal role in the plea
bargaining process.25 Plea negotiations are conducted between a prosecutor
and a defendant, excluding a victim from the negotiations. A victim is also
excluded from participating in the judicial hearing at which a judge decides
whether to accept a guilty plea proffered by a defendant. 26
There are two general classifications of plea bargaining, a sentence bargain
and a charge bargain.27 In a sentence bargain, a defendant pleads guilty to
the charges in exchange for a prosecutor's recommendation of a lenient
sentence or for a specified sentence. 21 A charge bargain may take three
forms. A defendant may plead guilty to a charge or charges in return for
a prosecutor's dismissal of other charges filed, a defendant may plead guilty
to a charge or charges in return for a prosecutor's promise not to file other
charges, or a defendant may plead guilty to a lesser included offense in
return for either a prosecutor's dismissal of the more serious charge or a
prosecutor's promise not to file the more serious charge.29
Once a prosecutor and a defendant agree on a plea, it is submitted to a
judge for acceptance.30 Acceptance of a plea agreement has traditionally
focused only on the interests of the defendant. Before accepting a plea, a
judge must determine that the defendant has entered the plea voluntarily3
23. Erez, Victim Participation in Sentencing: Rhetoric and Reality, 18 J. CRIM. JusT. 23
(1990).
24. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 251 (noting L. WEnREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE,
221-23).
25. Gittler, supra note 15, at 163-67.
26. Id. at,165.
27. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 301, 312-14 (1987).
28. Id. at 312-13.
29. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 766-67 (1985); Henderson,
supra note 3, at 977 n.197.
30. Welling, supra note 27, at 317.
31. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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(not under coercion) and that there is a factual basis for the plea.3 2 If a
judge is satisfied that these criteria have been met, he or she will normally
accept a plea.
III. VicTim's INTEREST IN RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE-RESTITUTION
Under the retributive theory of punishment, which seeks to restore the
relationships that have been broken by an offender's conduct,3 restitution
should be a primary criminal sanction. "In accordance with a retributive
theory of punishment, restitution aims at restoring the relationship between
the offender and the victim by making the offender pay for his crime. ' 34
Restitution is proportional because it is constructed to "fit the crime" and
to "emphasize the wrongfulness of the offense and the defendant's moral
responsibility."3 Some commentators have even gone so far as to argue
that restitution is the only appropriate sanction in a retributive theory of
punishment .36
Commentators who do not recognize a victim's right to participate in the
criminal process view restitution as only a civil remedy and not as an
appropriate criminal sanction.37 However, this view is contrary to historical
precedent 3 and overlooks the overlapping goals of the criminal and civil
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). Rule 11(f) states: "Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea
of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry
as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea."
For example, in Gilbert v. United States, 466 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1972), the defendant pleaded
guilty to four counts of interstate transportation of stolen money orders. However, had the
judge determined the factual basis for the plea, he would have discovered that there was only
one crossing of state lines. Thus, there was only one violation, not four. Because of this error,
the defendant was allowed to replead.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 11-17.
34. Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HAxv. L.
REv. 931, 939 (1984) [hereinafter Victim Restitution].
35. Id.
36. C. Anat & F. MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND RE STroN 59-69 (1984).
37. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 3, at 1007 ("As a theoretical matter, the civil courts
are the proper forum for victims to claim damages.").
38. D. VAN NESS, supra note 1, at 64-67; Gittler, supra note 15, at 132-33. Prior to the
separation of civil and criminal law, restitution was a common form of criminal sanction.
Hebrew, Greek, Roman, and ancient English and Germanic laws all provided for compensation
to crime victims. See S. SCHAFER, RE STITION TO VIcTMs o F CRIM 3-7 (1960). Even after
criminal and civil law were divided, restitution continued to be employed as a criminal sanction.
Restitution provisions were included in many of the earliest penal codes in the United States,
Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIm. L. BULL. 203, 204 (1978), and the
Supreme Court in 1913 allowed restitution as a condition for probation or parole. Bradford
v. United States, 228 U.S. 446 (1913). Today, states continue to provide restitution as a
criminal sanction. See e.g., ILL. A-N. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-5-6 (Smith-Hurd 1991); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 60.27 (McKinney 1987).
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systems.39 On a practical level, the distinctions between the criminal and
civil law have become increasingly blurred. Limiting restitution to the civil
forum fails to recognize the practical problems a victim faces when seeking
a civil remedy after criminal sanctions have been imposed. 40
Most commentators define "restitution" only as financial compensation
to a victim. 4' However, limiting the definition of restitution to financial
compensation limits a victim's interests to damages that can be quantified
in monetary terms. A broad definition of restitution would include com-
pensation for both financial and psychological harm and allow a victim to
claim an interest even in unquantifiable injuries. Further, broadening the
definition of restitution as a criminal sanction may encourage courts to use
nonpecuniary forms of restitution.42
The broad definition of a victim's restitutionary interest encompasses both
retribution and restitution, which are commonly broken down by commen-
tators as two interests. 43 However, retribution and restitution are not distinct;
rather, retribution envelopes restitution. Retribution justifies punishment
and provides the goals for which the criminal justice system should aim.
Restitution is a criminal sanction used to achieve a retributive goal.
A. Financial Restitution
The function most commonly associated with the term "restitution" is
to restore a victim to his or her financial status before the crime. Financial
restitution advances the retributionary concept of proportionality by penal-
izing an offender in precisely the same amount as the harm incurred by a
victim. Financial harm will constitute a large percentage of the total harm
39. Victim Restitution, supra note 34, at 935-37. For example, both civil and criminal law
attempt to "maximize public safety and promote economic efficiency." See id. at 936. Civil
law accomplishes these goals through negligence liability and liability for breach of contract.
Additionally, civil law remedies such as punitive and treble damages fulfill a deterrent goal.
See id.; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. Rav. 1173, 1174 (1931); see,
e.g., Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 12-27;
18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 660, 3285, 3691; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1988 & Supp. I 1989)).
40. See Gittler, supra note 15, at 138-39.
Victims may be unaware of the availability of a tort remedy; victims may lack
the resources to institute an action and be unable to obtain the assistance of
counsel on a contingent fee basis; victims may be unwilling to undergo the
inconvenience of bringing suit, especially if the damages are relatively small and
the offender is insolvent; and victims, who have already been through a criminal
proceeding, may not have the energy and stamina required to become involved
in yet another proceeding.
Id.
41. See, e.g., id. at 139; Welling, supra note 27, at 307.
42. Where "restitution" does not overly emphasize monetary compensation, judges may
be more inclined to impose punishments, such as community service, which do not directly
compensate the victim for his or her financial loss.
43. See, e.g., Welling, supra note 27, at 307-08.
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in most nonviolent crimes where emotional and physical harm are minimal.
Even in violent crimes, financial loss will contribute to the total harm
suffered by a victim and is a necessary component in the punishment
calculus.
A victim thus has an interest in having financial restitution imposed as
part of a defendant's sentence. However, approximately ninety percent of
all criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargain. 44 Because the conviction
sets the limits on the potential sentence, a victim would be interested in
insuring that the plea agreement provided for his or her financial compen-
sation. In a sentence bargain, a victim would argue that financial compen-
sation be included in the sentence recommendation. In a charge bargain, a
victim would press to have a defendant plead to a sufficient number of
charges or to a charge that is sufficiently serious to allow full financial
restitution.
The argument for a victim's participatory right in plea bargaining has
been strengthened by two recent events: the promulgation of the new Federal
Sentencing Guidelines45 and the Supreme Court's decision in Hughey v.
United States.46 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines increase the likelihood
that a charge bargain will be made, thus increasing a victim's interest in
ensuring that the charge or charges pleaded will allow for full restitution.
Hughey increases a victim's interest in plea bargaining by cutting off a
victim's ability to protect his or her restitutionary interests at a later stage
in the criminal process.
1. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were the culmination of widespread
dissatisfaction with the indeterminate sentencing system.4 7 Indeterminate
sentencing, based on the rehabilitative model of justice, appeared to produce
disparate sentences between similarly situated defendants and resulted in
public belief that the sentencing scheme was too lenient to many defen-
dants. 48
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines reduce the discriminatory and lenient
appearance of the sentencing system by reducing the discretion given to
44. See Gittler, supra note 15, at 164 (Eighty-five to ninety percent of criminal actions are
resolved by guilty pleas, many of which are products of plea bargaining.); see also W. LAFAvE
& J. IsRAEL, supra note 29, at 767 (criminal system is based on premise that 90% will plead
guilty).
45. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3601-3624, 3661-3673; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)).
46. 110 S. Ct. 1979 (1990).
47. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80
J. CR m. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 883, 883-85 (1990).
48. Id. at 883-84.
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judges. The Guidelines provide for a limited range of sentencing possibilities
for each type of offense.49 Once a defendant is convicted on a particular
charge, the judge must impose a sentence within the prescribed range of
sentences. By providing a narrow range of sentence possibilities, a judge's
discretion is effectively curtailed.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines enhance a victim's interest in plea
bargaining by increasing a prosecutor's incentive to make a charge bargain
which does not reflect the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. By
reducing the applicable range of sentences, sentence bargaining becomes less
attractive. A defendant understands that a judge may not impose a sentence
below the minimum in the applicable range. Thus, a prosecutor's promise
to request a lenient sentence loses much of its value. In order to obtain a
sentence agreeable to both prosecutor and defendant, either the seriousness
of the charge or the number of charges must be reduced. Reducing the
seriousness or number of charges directly affects the amount of restitution
a victim may receive. Therefore, a victim would have a strong interest in
ensuring that the seriousness of the charge or the number of charges pleaded
provides suitable compensation.
To illustrate how a charge bargain under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
might work, consider the following example. A defendant is arrested for
three bank robberies, two of which were armed robberies. The range of
sentences applicable to this defendant exceeds the amount for which the
defendant is willing to plead. Therefore, if the prosecutor desires to plead
the case away, he must reduce the range of applicable sentences. To do
this, the prosecutor can either drop two counts of bank robbery or charge
the two armed robberies as unarmed robberies. In either instance, the
applicable range of sentences is reduced and a plea bargain can be made.
A prosecutor can circumvent the sentencing guidelines by changing the
charges because the Sentencing Commission decided to base the range of
applicable sentences not on the consideration of an offender's real offense
conduct but on the charges of conviction.5
49. For example, the Guidelines provide for a 121- to 151-month (10 to 12'/, years) prison
sentence for a first-time offender convicted of trafficking in 10 kilograms of cocaine (Aggra-
vating or mitigating factors may, however, increase or decrease the applicable range.). A judge
may not deviate from this range without good reason.
50. Nagel, supra note 47, at 925-27. The base offense level is determined solely by the
offense(s) of conviction. This base level may then be modified by characteristics of real offense
behavior. In other words, real offense behavior determines where in the range the sentence
will fall. Id. at 926. Therefore, a victim's total monetary loss may be considered in determining
the length of an offender's prison sentence, but due process and the Hughey case, infra notes
53-62 and accompanying text, prohibit a defendant from having to pay restitution for crimes
for which he has not been convicted. Therefore, a prosecutor's decision to charge bargain
directly affects a victim's ability to receive full restitution. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
increase the likelihood that a charge bargain will be made.
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The Sentencing Commission cannot dictate to a United States Attorney
what counts to charge, since that is exclusively an executive decision.
For example, if a federal prosecutor chooses to circumvent the guidelines
by charging a defendant arrested for distributing 500 grams of cocaine
with a phone count-resulting in less than one-fifth the sentence expo-
sure-there is little the Commission can do about it.sI
While a victim has an interest in seeing that sufficient charges are pleaded
so that full restitution may be possible, "a decision to charge only one or
to dismiss .. .counts pursuant to a [plea] bargain precludes any consider-
ation of the ... uncharged or dismissed [counts] in determining a guideline
range, unless the plea agreement included a stipulation as to the other
[counts]."5 2 Therefore, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines undermine a vic-
tim's interest by increasing a prosecutor's incentive to reduce the seriousness
or number of charges, thus limiting a victim's ability to receive full financial
recovery.
2. Hughey v. United States
The Supreme Court's decision in Hughey strengthens a victim's argument
for a participatory role in plea bargaining by limiting his or her ability to
receive full financial restitution at sentencing. In Hughey, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among appellate circuits regarding
a court's ability under the Victim and Witness Protection Act 53 to require
an offender to pay restitution for acts that do not constitute an offense for
which the offender has been convicted.54
Hughey was arrested for and indicted on three counts of theft as a postal
employee and three counts of use of unauthorized credit cards.55 The
damages allegedly caused by Hughey were over $147,000.6 Hughey pleaded
51. Id. at 936 n.277 (citation omitted). Recognizing the problem of prosecutorial discretion
under the new sentencing guidelines, Richard Thornburgh, the United States Attorney General
at the time, issued a memorandum on this issue to all federal prosecutors in March, 1989.
Memorandum from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, to Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13,
1989) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum] (discussing plea bargaining under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984). The memo urged the prosecutors to conform their plea practices to the
goals of the sentencing guidelines. The Attorney General's memo stated that the Justice
Department's policy regarding bargaining was that "charges are not to be bargained away or
dropped, unless the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government's ability readily
to prove a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons." Id. at 3. The extent to which the memo
has changed the plea practices of prosecutors is yet to be determined.
52. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 51, at 3.
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580 (1982 ed. & Supp. IV) (repealed 1984), amended and
renumbered as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3601-3625, 3661-3673; 28 U.S.C. §§
991-998 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)).
54. Hughey, 110 S. Ct. at 1982.
55. Id. at 1981.
56. Id.
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guilty to only one count of unauthorized use of a credit card in return for
dismissal of the remaining charges.Y The government then sought a resti-
tution order for the full amount of the victims' losses, $147,000.58 Hughey
contended that restitution could be ordered only for the amount of losses
caused by the one count he pleaded guilty to, losses totalling only $10,412.19
The Court agreed with Hughey and held that a restitution award based
on the Victim and Witness Protection Act was authorized only for the loss
caused by the specific conduct that was the basis for the offense of
conviction. 60 In his opinion, Justice Marshall stated that although the goal
of the Victim and Witness Protection Act was to ensure that "crime victims
receive the fullest possible restitution from criminal wrongdoers' '6 the Act
did not protect victims from the "effects of such a [plea] bargaining
process." 62
B. Psychic Restitution
Although the retributive theory of justice dictates, in part, that an offender
''pay" a punishment sufficient to restore a victim to his or her status quo
ante,6 13 financial loss is only part of the loss a victim suffers as a result of
crime. A victim will always suffer psychological trauma as well.64 Therefore,
to be consistent with the retributive theory of punishment, the criminal
justice system must assist a victim in resolving the psychological harm
caused by an offender's conduct. Currently, however, the plea bargaining
process alienates a victim and hinders the resolution of his or her psycho-
logical trauma .6
Commentators usually refer to the victim's interest in psychic restitution
as "retributive";6 they equate the "retributive" interest with a victim's
desire for revenge or retaliation.6 7 They argue that allowing a victim to
retaliate against an offender in a formal setting aids resolution of the event
by providing the victim with a cathartic experience. 68 However, a victim's
desire for revenge or retaliation undermines the retributive concept of
proportionality. 69 For example, "a victim may believe that an auto thief
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1982.
60. Id. at 1981.
61. Id. at 1985 (citation omitted) (quoting 128 CONr. REc. 27,391 (Oct. 1, 1982) (remarks
of Rep. Rodino)),
62. Id.
63. See supra Part I.
64. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 953-64 (discussing the psychology of victimization).
65. Id. at 979.
66. See, e.g., Welling, supra note 27, at 307.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 307 n.25; Henderson, supra note 3, at 979.
69. Henderson, supra note 3, at 996.
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should be hanged and may muster a variety of moral arguments in support
of his position, [but] proportionality requires a rejection of the victim's
position."70
Psychic restitution is a sanction imposed on a defendant that provides
the victim an emotional resolution of the crime experience. However, a
sanction based on revenge will not provide true resolution but suppress it.
Vengeance will not likely allow a victim to recover psychologically, but its
opposite, forgiveness, will enable the victim to be restored emotionally.
[Florgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, which acts in the form
of re-acting against an original trespassing, whereby far from putting
an end to the consequences of the first misdeed, everybody remains
bound to the process .... In contrast to revenge ... [florgiving ...
is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and
unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore
freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one
who is forgiven.7 '
Forgiveness, rather than vengeance, therefore, allows a victim to place the
criminal experience behind him or her and restores the relationship between
a victim and offender.
The current plea bargaining process does not protect a victim's interest
in psychic restitution by facilitating forgiveness. Instead, by placing a
premium on obtaining convictions regardless of a victim's psychological
harm, the system aggravates the sense of helplessness and the loss of control
produced by the crime.7 2
Moreover, a victim who is not consulted or notified about a plea bargain
will view the criminal process as an invalidation of his or her experience,
especially where charges are dropped or reduced.73 This invalidation con-
tributes to the denial already taking place within the victim.7 4 "[U]ntil the
victim acknowledges the actual experience as hers or his alone-that she
was raped, that he was mugged-the victim is virtually powerless to be free
from the rapist or the mugger. ' 7 5
Only a plea process that emphasizes an offender's responsibility for his
or her criminal act enables a victim to accept what happened and to
eventually come to the point of forgiveness.7 6 Only then will the relationships
between victim and offender and victim and community be restored.
70. Id.
71. H. ARENDT, Tim HuMAN CONDITION 240-41 (1958).
72. Erez, supra note 23, at 24.
73. Henderson, supra note 3, at 981.
74. Id. at 961-62.
75. Id. at 962 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
76. A plea process that contributes to a victim's denial makes forgiveness impossible. How
can a person forgive another when he or she does not believe a wrong was committed? To
forgive, a victim must believe that he or she was wronged, then the victim may forgive the
wrongdoer. Only a process encouraging recognition of responsibility and discouraging victim
denial will lead to forgiveness. See infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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One of the "biggest fictions" in the plea bargaining process is the practice
of allowing a defendant to plead guilty while at the same time maintaining
his or her innocence. 77 This practice, authorized by the Supreme Court in
North Carolina v. Alford,78 undermines the retributive theory of punishment.
Alford was arrested and indicted for first-degree murder. 79 The prosecution
alleged that Alford had taken a gun from his house with the intent to kill
the victim and later returned claiming that he had carried out the killing. 0
Upon the recommendation of his attorney, Alford pleaded guilty to second-
degree murder." At the plea hearing, however, Alford testified that he had
not committed murder but had pleaded guilty to avoid the risk of the death
penalty.12 On a habeas petition, Alford argued that the trial judge should
not have accepted his guilty plea because he had not admitted guilt. 83
The Supreme Court upheld the plea to second-degree murder despite
Alford's protestation of innocence, reasoning that:
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an
express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional
requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused
of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.-
Since the premise underlying retributive justice is that an individual may
only be punished if he or she "deserves" it, punishment is only justified
where an individual is "guilty." The imposition of punishment when the
defendant maintains innocence indicates to the defendant that he or she is
merely a means to an end: more convictions. An Alford plea thus signifies
to defendants, victims, and society that "guilt" may be ignored when it is
expedient to do S0.5
Despite a victim's psychic restitutionary interest in the criminal process,
it may be argued that victim participation in the plea bargaining process
does not contribute significantly to the resolution of a victim's psychological
harm. This argument would be based on the fact that a defendant may
enter a guilty plea and still maintain his or her innocence. Because forgive-
ness requires, in part, an acknowledgement of responsibility on the part of
an offender, 86 a victim will still be unable to achieve true resolution. Even
77. Fine, Plea Bargaining: An Unnecessary Evil, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 615, 621 (1987).
78. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
79. Id. at 26.
80. Id. at 28.
81. Id. at 27.
82. Id. at 28.
83. See id. at 27-31.
84. Id. at 37.
85. Fine, supra note 77, at 620.
86. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text; Luke 17:3-4 (New International). ("If
your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he repents, forgive him. If he sins against you seven
times in a day, and seven times comes back to you and says 'I repent,' forgive him)."
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with a participatory role, a victim would perceive the plea as the product
of a system that seeks only convictions and uses a victim merely as a means
to an end. This argument is given substance by the Supreme Court's decision
in Alford.
Allowing a defendant to make his or her way through the criminal justice
system without admitting any responsibility for his or her actions increases
a victim's sense of alienation. While a victim emotionally denies the event
and struggles to come to terms with what has happened to him or her, the
government in effect tells a victim that the state, not the victim, was harmed
by a defendant's conduct. By agreeing to plead guilty, a defendant admits
responsibility to the state but denies any responsibility to a victim. The
system's failure to recognize a defendant's obligation to assume responsi-
bility for harm done to a victim thus further invalidates a victim's crime
experience.
It may be argued that a defendant's dignity is preserved by respecting his
or her decision to accept a sure level of punishment rather than risk a more
severe punishment in trying to prove his or her innocence. However, this
argument misses the mark by failing to recognize the ultimate goal of
retribution: "to permit[] the criminal to atone for his crime and then be
reconciled to society." If an offender is allowed to escape recognition of
guilt, he or she will never come to the point of "atonement," and the goal
of retribution will never be achieved.
Alford does not end the matter, however. A state may still preserve a
retributive theory of justice by requiring defendants to admit guilt before a
plea may be accepted. The Court in Alford only held that it is not
constitutionally impermissible to accept a plea without an admission of
guilt. 8 A state may, however, require admission of guilt as a prerequisite
to the acceptance of a guilty plea.
Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every consti-
tutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes to so
plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the
Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court .... [T]he
States may bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from any
defendants who assert their innocence."9
IV. INTERESTS AND ROLES OF TRADITIONAL PLEA BARGAIN PARTIES
AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION
A. The Judge
Under a retributive theory of justice, a judge has the responsibility to
ensure that the punishment meted out to a defendant is proportional to the
87. Jensen, supra note 7, at 14.
88. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-39.
89. Id. at 38 n.11 (citation omitted).
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seriousness of a defendant's conduct. A judge, therefore, must perform the
seriousness calculus (harm x responsibility) and decide where on the pun-
ishment scale the crime fits.9
In a plea bargain, a judge must decide whether to accept the plea and,
if accepted, what punishment the plea merits. Acceptance of a guilty plea
requires a judge to determine the voluntariness of the plea and whether
there is a factual basis for the plea.91 The determination of voluntariness
focuses exclusively on a defendant and will not be elaborated in this Note.92
Additional information would, however, aid a judge in determining the
factual basis for the plea. Victim participation would also help a judge in
working through the punishment calculus by providing more information
about a victim's harm. 93
1. Factual Basis Examination
The purpose of requiring a judge to determine the factual basis for a
plea bargain was initially to protect the defendant.9 A factual basis inquiry
provides the court with a better assessment of a defendant's willingness and
ability to plead guilty as well as his or her understanding of the charges. 95
The inquiry also provides a more accurate record, reducing the possibility
that the plea could be successfully challenged on appeal. 96
As well as protecting a defendant, a factual basis inquiry also serves a
retributive purpose by ensuring that the pleaded charge accurately reflects
the nature of a defendant's conduct. Through a factual basis inquiry a
judge can make sure that the punishment imposed is one that a defendant
"deserves."
Problems matching the factual basis for a plea to a defendant's
conduct often occur as a result of a charge bargain. Although many
charge bargains result in the reduction of a charge to a lesser, logically
included offense, sometimes the charge to which a defendant pleads is
not a logical included offense of the actual crime.97 This type of plea
90. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
92. A plea is made "voluntarily" where it is not the result of any unlawful threats or
improper promises. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); see generally W. LAFAvE
& J. ISRAEL, supra note 29, at 802-03.
93. See supra note 19.
94. Cf. W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 29, at 808 (Protecting a defendant is the most
important function that a factual inquiry serves.).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Fine, supra note 77, at 620-21.
One common plea bargain in Wisconsin is to reduce a charge of "operating [a]
vehicle without [the] owner's consent," a two-year felony, to "joyriding," a
nine-month misdemeanor, even though the car may have been damaged and
return of the vehicle undamaged within twenty-four hours is an element of the
misdemeanor charge.
Id. at 620 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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bargain is made by "fiddling" with the facts of the case. 98 For instance,
in a jurisdiction with an offense of breaking and entering in the nighttime
(a nonprobationable offense with a 15-year maximum) and an offense
of breaking and entering in the daytime (a probationable offense with
a 5-year maximum), a bargained plea to the latter offense may be
tendered although the facts show that the crime occurred at midnight."
In these situations, a defendant does not receive the punishment that is
"deserved" for the crime committed.
Participation by a victim would provide a judge with more facts on which
to base his or her decision whether to accept a plea. Even though exami-
nation of the defendant, the prosecution, and the presentence reports
provides facts, recitation of the event by a victim will give a judge a better
sense of what actually occurred.
Victims, no less than defendants, are entitled to their day in court.
Victims, no less than defendants, are entitled to have their views con-
sidered. A judge cannot evaluate the seriousness of a defendant's conduct
without knowing how the crime has burdened the victim. A judge cannot
reach an informed determination of the danger posed by a defendant
without hearing from the person he has victimized.'0'
A plea should not be accepted when the facts regarding the alleged crime
do not support the charge to which a defendant bargained. But even when
the facts do support the bargained charge, it does not follow that a plea
should automatically be accepted. This was the case in Alford, but Alford
undermines the retributive theory of punishment by excluding a victim's
psychic restitutionary interest and by hindering an offender's reconciliation
to the community.' 0 Even if a factual basis for a plea bargain exists, a
plea should not be accepted if it does not provide "just" punishment for
an offender's conduct. In other words, if the punishment called for by a
plea bargain is too lenient, a judge should reject the plea.
2. Sentence Bargain
Where a plea agreement calls for the granting of sentencing concessions
to a defendant, a judge may simply reject the plea if he or she believes
98. Fine, supra note 77, at 621.
99. Y. KAmISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1271 (7th ed.
1990) (citation omitted); see also People v. Foster, 225 N.E.2d 200, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1967)
(The defendant was charged with first-degree murder but pleaded guilty to attempted second-
degree manslaughter. While attempted manslaughter is a legal impossibility, conviction was
upheld because defendant sought the plea and agreed to it.).
100. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 76-77 (1982) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
101. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Gaskins, 485
F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court held in Gaskins that "it is an abuse of discretion to
refuse a guilty plea solely because the defendant does not admit the alleged facts of the crime."
Id. at 1048. But see United States v. Biscoe, 518 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cox, 923 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to follow the reasoning of Gaskins).
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that the sentence is too lenient. Even if a judge decides to accept a
defendant's plea, however, he or she may disregard the plea agreement by
imposing a more severe sentence. A judge is given complete discretion as
to the appropriateness of a sentence.'02 Therefore, an agreement between
prosecutor and defendant regarding the sentence is not binding on a judge. 103
3. Charge Bargain
Rejection of a charge bargain because it is too lenient on a defendant
has been the subject of considerable debate.104 United States v. Ammidown'03
is one of the leading cases in this area and has been criticized for limiting
a trial judge's discretion to reject a plea bargain that reduces or drops a
charge or charges. In Ammidown, the defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder for conspiring with another person to kill his wife.' 6 The
defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial court abused
its discretion by rejecting the defendant's plea to second-degree murder.107
The trial judge rejected the plea because the facts of the case indicated a
second-degree murder charge was contrary to the public interest. 0
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the trial
court decision and declared that a trial judge may reject a prosecutor's
decision to reduce or drop charges for only three reasons: (1) "fairness to
the defense, such as protection against harassment";'19 (2) "fairness to the
prosecution interest, as in avoiding a disposition that does not serve due
and legitimate prosecutorial interests";"0 and (3) "protection of the sen-
102. See United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1977) (judge had complete
discretion to reject a sentence bargain).
103. Id. A judge may reject a sentence bargain in two ways because there are two types of
sentence bargains. These two sentence bargains are set forth in FaD. R. Can. P. 11(e). The
first type, described in Rule 11(e)(1)(B), allows a defendant to plead guilty in return for a
prosecutor's promise to recommend a particular sentence or not to oppose defendant's request
for a particular sentence. Once a prosecutor fulfills his or her duty to recommend or not to
oppose a sentence, the bargain is satisfied. Rule l1(e)(1)(B) makes clear that a plea is not
binding on the court. If a judge then rejects a plea and enters a different sentence, a defendant
cannot withdraw his or her plea. Rule ll(e)(2).
The second type of plea bargain, described in Rule 1 1(e)(1)(C), allows a defendant to plead
guilty in return for a specific sentence. In this type of plea, a defendant may withdraw his or
her plea if a judge does not impose the specific sentence agreed to. Therefore, where a judge
accepts a plea but then imposes a sentence different than the one provided for in the agreement,
a defendant is allowed to withdraw his or her plea. Rule 1l(e)(4).
104. See generally Welling, supra note 27, at 319-38 (discussing extent of a trial court's
power to reject a plea bargain because it is too lenient on a defendant).
105. 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
106. Id. at 617-18.
107. Id. at 618.
108. Id.




tencing authority reserved to the judge."'' The effect of the Ammidown
decision is that a judge may only reject a charge bargain when "the action
of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from sound prosecutorial
principle as to mark it as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion." ' 1 2
Since a judge must be able to reject a plea that is too lenient with respect
to an offender's conduct in order to ensure just deserts, the Ammidown
decision conflicts with a just deserts rationale. This conflict can be resolved
either by overruling the Ammidown decision or by adding "fairness to a
victim" as another factor for which a judge may reject a plea.
Ammidown's status as a leading case is suspect for a number of reasons."'
First, the case was decided under Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (the dismissal rule) instead of Rule 11 (the rule relating to
acceptance of plea bargains).1 4 Why the court went to such lengths to
circumvent a Rule 11 analysis is not clear. However, it appears that a court
may still use a Rule 11 analysis to dispose of a plea that a judge believes
is too lenient.
Second, after Ammidown, Rule 11 was amended to give trial judges
more discretion to reject plea bargains." 5 Further, the weight of other
federal" 6 and state" 7 cases indicates that trial judges have broad discretion
to reject plea bargains that are too lenient on a defendant.
Third, Ammidown does not reflect the reality of the plea-bargaining
process. It makes a distinction between sentence bargains and charge bar-
gains where, in practice, there is none. Especially since the new Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, the primary significance of a charge bargain "plainly
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Welling, supra note 27, at 331.
114. Id. Rule 48 provides, in pertinent part: "The Attorney General or the United States
attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint
and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate." FED. R. Cans. P. 48(a).
115. Welling, supra note 27, at 331. Rule 11(e) states:
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the
parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in
open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is
offered. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(A) [dismissal
of other charges] or (C) [agreement that specific sentence is appropriate], the
court may accept or reject the agreement .... If the agreement is of the type
specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B) [prosecutor's recommendation, or agreement not
to oppose defendant's request, for a particular sentence], the court shall advise
the defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request
the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea.
FED. R. Cans. P. 11(e)(2) (emphasis added).
116. See United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bean, 564
F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
117. See People v. Ferguson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 732, 361 N.E.2d 333 (1977); State v. Lematty,
263 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977); City of Akron v. Ragsdale, 61 Ohio App. 2d 107,




lies in its effect on the sentence the defendant will receive."" 8 In practice,
charge bargains are used to circumvent a judge's authority in sentencing.
Tying a court's hands in charge bargain situations implicitly gives a prose-
cutor authority over sentencing." 9 The Ammidown court itself recognized
the importance of protecting judicial authority over sentencing by explicitly
listing interference with judicial sentencing discretion as an appropriate
reason for rejecting a plea. 20
Even if Ammidown cannot be overruled or discredited, it can be reconciled
with a just deserts rationale by adding "fairness to a victim" as a fourth
factor in determining whether a charge bargain may appropriately be re-
jected. In Ammidown, the court stated that a judge may reject a plea
bargain if he or she finds that a prosecutor failed to give consideration to
factors that must be given consideration in the "public interest.' 2' Because
a victim's harm is one component in determining the level of punishment
society believes is "deserved,' 2 2 including fairness to a victim as a factor
in the public interest analysis would be appropriate. This would allow a
judge to reject a plea bargain where it appears that a prosecutor did not
sufficiently consider a victim's interests.
Once a plea agreement has been reached, a victim should be able to
present to a judge his or her interpretation of what happened and what
harm he or she has suffered. The additional information provided by a
victim will enhance the quality of the decision rendered by a judge.
B. The Defendant
Victim participation in plea bargaining does not significantly affect any
legitimate interest of a defendant in the criminal justice system. A defendant
may have a number of reasons for wanting to avoid trial. For example, a
defendant will seek the most lenient sentence, which may be more lenient
than he or she "deserves." In order to accomplish this, a defendant will
seek to minimize the incriminating information to which a prosecutor and
a judge are exposed.'12 He or she may fear that a judge will impose a more
severe sentence after hearing all of the details from the victims and witnesses
than if a judge were exposed merely to a dispassionate recitation of facts
from the lawyers.'2 However, a desire to obtain a sentence that is less than
what is "deserved" is not a legitimate reason to exclude victim participation.
118. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 29, at 800.
119. See id.
120. Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 622; see supra note III and accompanying text.
121. Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 622.
122. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
123. Welling, Victims in the Criminal Process: A Utilitarian Analysis of Victim Participation
in the Charging Decision, 30 ARiz. L. REv. 85, 89 (1988).
124. Fine, supra note 77, at 623.
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A defendant does have a legitimate interest in avoiding trial in order to
obtain the lowest possible sentence in the range of applicable sentences. In
these situations, a defendant does not avoid "just" punishment but rather
seeks the least severe punishment that society has deemed "just" for his or
her crime. Victim participation in the plea process may hamper this interest
by increasing the likelihood that a defendant's plea will be rejected.'2
Although victim participation may make acceptance of a plea less likely, a
defendant "has no right to have the court assess the plea bargain on less
than the total amount of available information.'
2 6
A defendant also has a legitimate interest in avoiding vindictive conduct
on the part of the prosecution.1 27 A prosecutor may "raise the stakes" in
order to obtain a guilty plea, but under Bordenkircher v. Hayes,128 he or
she may not "coerce" a defendant into accepting the plea. However, after
Bordenkircher, the line between inducement and coercion is difficult to
ascertain.
In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor "promised" to seek an indictment under
the state's recidivist statute if the defendant would not plead guilty.1 29 The
Court held that this "promise" was not coercive and upheld the defendant's
guilty plea. 30 Speaking for the majority, Justice Stewart declared that "in
the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punish-
ment or retaliation [by the prosecutor] so long as the accused is free to
accept or reject the prosecution's offer."''
It is possible, however, for a prosecutor's offer to be so good that a
defendant really is not "free" to reject the offer. 3 2 By offering excessive
inducements, a prosecutor may effectively extort a guilty plea from a
defendant. The Supreme Court recognized this possibility when it first
examined the legitimacy of plea bargaining in Brady v. United States.33
While approving the practice of plea bargaining, the Court in Brady
cautioned against "the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both,
deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a par-
ticular defendant to tender a plea of guilty.' 13 4
Victim participation may help, rather than harm, the defendant's interests
by guarding against vindictive prosecutorial conduct. 13 5 A victim can assist
125. Welling, supra note 27, at 312.
126. Id.
127. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
128. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
129. Id. at 358.
130. Id. at 365.
131. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
132. See Fine, supra note 77, at 621-23.
133. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
134. Id. at 751 n.8.
135. In cases such as Bordenkircher, where the "threat" involves charges unrelated to a
defendant's crime, victim participation would be ineffective in protecting a defendant against
a prosecutor's vindictive plea practices.
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a judge in obtaining all available information regarding the nature of a
defendant's conduct. This information will enable a judge to ascertain what
charges could be filed against a defendant. Knowledge of the nature of a
defendant's conduct and the possible charges will help a judge determine
the voluntariness of a plea bargain. If a plea appears to a judge to be
unreasonably lenient compared to the nature of a defendant's conduct, a
judge would have good reason to believe that a plea was not voluntary and
thus could probe further into the circumstances surrounding a plea. This
would hold especially true where a defendant pleads guilty while maintaining
his or her innocence. 136
C. The Prosecutor
The primary goal of a prosecutor is to "seek justice on behalf of
society..' 1137 On a theoretical level, providing a prosecutor with additional
information from a victim would further a prosecutor's ability to seek
justice. In a criminal system based on retribution, "justice" is achieved by
giving an offender his or her just deserts. Just deserts result when a
punishment proportional to the seriousness of the crime is imposed. 3
Proportionality, however, is not an exact science in the sense that one single
"absolute" punishment can be identified as "just." Proportionality is a
result of society's experience and sense of morality. A proportional punish-
ment is, therefore, defined in "terms ... the particular society views as
appropriate for the crime. 1' 39 Society incorporates a victim's harm into its
calculus of "justice." Thus, it follows that a prosecutor must seek to pursue
a victim's interest in his or her quest for "justice on behalf of society."
Seeking justice, however, is not a prosecutor's only goal and, on a
practical level, a prosecutor's goals often diverge from those of a victim.
If the prosecutor's duty to achieve justice and not merely convictions is
interpreted to include consideration of the victim's interests, then im-
plementing victim participation through the prosecutor is theoretically
136. This problem may be eliminated by simply not allowing guilty pleas without an
admission of guilt. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
Plea bargaining does not encompass situations where the facts merit charge reductions,
dismissals, or a lenient sentence. Fine, supra note 77, at 616. Plea bargaining exists only when
the facts merit a more severe sentence, but the prosecutor lowers the severity of a charge or
reduces charges in order to "buy" the defendant's guilty plea. "[I]f a case initially charged
as 'first degree murder' is discovered to be, in reality, 'manslaughter,' reducing the charge to
'manslaughter' is not plea bargaining but justice." Id.
137. Welling, supra note 27, at 310; see also Henderson, supra note 3, at 980-81 n.211
(Under MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILrry EC 7-13 (1979), it is the duty of a
prosecutor to seek justice, not just convictions.).
138. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
139. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 249.
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consistent with the prosecutor's current role. However, on a practical
level, the prosecutor's interests are often inconsistent with the victim's
interests.' 4
One goal often noted by commentators is the swift disposition of cases.'
41
This is the primary justification for plea bargaining. 42 Plea bargaining is
supposed to facilitate justice by unclogging the courts and reserving judicial
resources for cases that most merit trial.
1 43
Prosecutors fear that giving victims a participatory role in the plea process
will undermine this goal in two ways.'" First, victim participation will result
in fewer plea bargains, thus clogging the court system. 45 Second, allowing
victims to participate in plea negotiations will disrupt and slow down the
plea process.' l
Evidence suggests, however, that prosecutors' fears are unwarranted. The
claim that fewer pleas will be made is based on the assumption that victims
demand only harsher prison sentences. However, research indicates that
when victims recommend imprisonment they do so because they are unaware
of alternative sentencing solutions such as restitution, community service,
or other diversionary dispositions. 47 Also, victim participation does not
result in increased sentence severity, delays, or expense.'" In fact, victim
participation may in some instances result in a quicker disposition of the
case 49 or even reduced sentences and reduced use of imprisonment.5 0 In
sum, victim participation does not conflict with the role of the prosecutor
in a retributive theory of punishment.
V. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE PLEA BARGAIN PROCESS
The present plea bargain system does not succeed in achieving retributive
goals because a victim's needs are not addressed. To better effectuate a
retributive justice system, a number of changes can be made to the plea-
bargaining process.
140. Welling, supra note 27, at 347 n.247.
141. Id. at 310.
142. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 29, at 767.
143. See id.
144. Welling, supra note 27, at 310.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Henderson & Gitchoff, Using Experts and Victims in the Sentencing Process, 17 CRIM.
L. BULL. 226, 230 (1981).
148. Erez, supra note 23, at 25; see A. HEINZ & W. KERSTETrER, Victim Participation in
Plea Bargaining: A Field Study, in PLEA BARGAINING 167 (1980).
149. Cf. Heinz & Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in
Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 349, 364-65 (1979) (discussing the results of experimental
pretrial conferences attended by the victim and the defendant).
150. A. HEINZ & W. KERSTETTER, supra note 148.
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A. Plea Negotiations
1. Written Statement
Before a prosecutor makes a plea offer, he or she should be required to
give a victim a written statement that clearly defines the proposed offer.
The statement should include a description of what charges may legitimately
be brought against a defendant and an explanation of why a prosecutor
believes the proposed plea is appropriate. The statement should inform a
victim of other sentencing options and diversionary dispositions for which
a defendant may be eligible. Finally, the statement should provide a victim
with the date, place, and time of a defendant's arraignment along with a
telephone number where a prosecutor may be reached for questions. Pre-
paring this statement would not unnecessarily burden a prosecutor. The
statement would not need to be elaborate and could be produced easily in
the course of business.
Once a prosecutor has given a victim the written statement and before
he or she has presented the offer to a defendant, he or she should be
required to consult with the victim. During the consultation, a prosecutor
should describe the proposed plea offer and solicit any recommendations
from a victim. Consulting with a victim avoids alienating him or her. 5 ' A
prosecutor must take notice of a victim's concerns and make a good faith
effort to address them.
2. Victim-Offender Reconciliation
As discussed in Part I, the just deserts theory of punishment dictates that
the relationship between victim and offender be reconciled. The victim wants
to find out reasons for the crime and therefore needs to be given the
opportunity to ask the defendant questions. He or she needs to express
anger to a defendant and discuss how the crime has affected his or her life.
The victim must also be given an opportunity to forgive the defendant. In
turn, a defendant needs the opportunity to acknowledge that his or her
"actions have hurt another person, to ask forgiveness, and to try to make
amends."' 5 2 Our present plea bargain system does not facilitate this type of
interaction.
151. If only a written statement were required, a victim would likely view it as mere
notification and believe that any concerns voiced would not alter a prosecutor's decision. See
supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
152. D. VAN NEss, supra note 1, at 166.
[C]rime had to be personalized and ... the antagonists-victim and offender-
should be brought together in the search for a reasonable disposition of the case.
For government to penalize the offender for violating the law misses the real
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Therefore, at some point before a plea agreement is reached, the victim
and offender should be given an opportunity to meet. The meeting should
be voluntary for both defendant and victim. 53 The purpose of the meeting
would be to discuss the defendant's conduct and its effects on the victim
and to structure a plea agreement to offer to a judge.
Once a plea agreement has been reached, the victim should not be able
to veto it.54 Prosecutors are given broad discretion in the charging deci-
sion. 55 Allowing a victim to veto a plea agreement he or she does not like
effectively nullifies the prosecutor's charging discretion. However, this should
not end the matter for a victim.
B. Plea Acceptance
When a final plea agreement has been reached, the plea must be submitted
to a judge for acceptance. At this time, the victim should be given the right
to state in writing or orally his or her recollection of the facts and why he
or she does not like the plea agreement.
Granting a victim a right to communicate with a judge enables a victim
to ensure that his or her interests are considered at each stage of the plea
process. At a plea hearing a victim can try to persuade a judge of the
merits of restitution. A victim's participation also allows a judge to receive
all available information so that the most "just" disposition can be obtained.
CONCLUSION
Victims have been gaining many new rights in the criminal system. These'
gains have been attributed mainly to victims' desires for revenge or
point: The government, through laws, offers the vehicle to discipline those who
impose upon the rights of their neighbors. But when government assumes the
role of the wronged.., then it depersonalizes the incident. The offender wronged
a real, live person and only incidentally the faceless society as a whole .... Face
to face, the victim explains the impact of the criminal act; that there is real
personal and property loss.
Callow, Crime and Consequence: When the Offender Is Forced to Get to Know His Victim
Before Sentence, 20 THE JUDGES' J. 34, 50 (1981).
153. D. VAN NEss, supra note 1, at 168. In programs similar to the one proposed in this
Note, 68% of victims and offenders met. Id. Of those surveyed, 86% were positive about the
outcome. Id.
154. If a victim and a defendant, with the help of a prosecutor, are successful at negotiating
a plea, a victim will not seek to veto it. However, in cases where a prosecutor desires to
accept a plea agreement over the objection of a victim, a victim should not have the power
to nullify the agreement. The ultimate decision should be left to a prosecutor's discretion.
155. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (prosecutorial discretion
in charging held to be "particularly ill-suited to ... review"); Inmates of Attica Correctional
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussion of court's reluctance to review
charging decisions); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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retaliation. However, victim participation in the plea-bargaining process is
appropriate under a just deserts theory of retribution. Victim participation
in plea bargaining would pr6tect a victim's interest in both financial and
psychic restitution without encroaching on the interests of the traditional
plea bargain parties-judge, defendant, and prosecutor.
The present plea bargain system undermines the retributive theory of
just deserts by excluding considerations of a victim. The defects in plea
bargaining can be cured and reconciled with just deserts retribution by (1)
requiring a prosecutor to provide a victim with a written statement setting
forth a proposed plea offer and other information relevant to a victim's
case, (2) requiring a prosecutor to consult with a victim before a plea
proposal is made to a defendant, (3) giving a victim and an offender an
opportunity for reconciliation, and (4) giving a victim the right to be heard
at a plea hearing.
